Business Workshop: Will Gun Rights Supersede Employer Rights?

Jane Lewis Volk, Esquire
jlv@muslaw.com

The "at-will" firing rights of Pennsylvania employers could be threatened by those advocating an expansion of the right to carry firearms in public.

At-will employment means that an employer can fire any employee at any time without cause -- as long as the firing does not violate law, contract or public policy.

The "public policy exception" enables employees to fight a termination if they can identify a specific provision of state law or the constitution which states or expresses a public policy that would prohibit their termination.

A recent decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that Kentucky has a "strong public policy in favor of exempting a person's vehicle from restrictions on the possession of deadly weapons." The court ruled in favor of an at-will employee who brought a wrongful discharge lawsuit against his former employer after being fired for keeping a pistol in his car, which was parked in his employer's parking lot.

The court reasoned that Kentucky's protection of gun rights superseded the employer's right to ban firearms on its property.

Pennsylvania courts tend to review "public policy" claims carefully, and rarely find a clear expression of public policy prohibiting the termination of an at-will employee.

It is an open question as to whether Pennsylvania courts would conclude that there is a well-defined public policy that would trump an employer's right to terminate an at-will employee under circumstances similar to those in the Kentucky case.

But Pennsylvania legislators are working to eliminate the uncertainty. A bill titled the "Preservation and Protection of Firearms in Motor Vehicles Act" is currently pending in the general assembly, and it would recognize every citizen's right to conceal a firearm in their vehicle, and prohibit employers from interfering with that right.

Pennsylvania employers concerned about the possible erosion of their at-will rights as employers should contact their state legislators about the proposed law.

 

For more information on this topic, please contact Jane Lewis Volk at jlv@muslaw.com.

 

This article originally appeared in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette's Business Workshop section.  Business workshop is a weekly feature from local experts offering tidbits on matters affecting business.  Read more: 

http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/business/news/business-workshop-will-gun-rights-supersede-employer-rights-652591/#ixzz27oWPCZIm

2012 Construction Law Newsletter

Please click here to download the latest edition of the Construction Law Newsletter. 

Articles in this edition include:

• Contractors Paying Same Tax Twice? - written by Brandon Rothey
• Union Trustees Now Have Lien Rights in Pennsylvania - written by Jim Mall
• Use of Construction Mortgage Proceeds May Impact Mechanic's Lien Priority - written by Josh Lorenz
• No Waiver of Mandatory Bid Requirements - written by Chad Michaelson
• Board of Claims Not Exclusive Venue for Contract Disputes with Commonwealth - written by Chad Michaelson
• Changes Proposed to Pennsylvania Mechanics' Lien Law - written by Jason Yarbrough

If you would like to be added to our Construction Law mail/email list please email: postmaster@muslaw.com.

Feeling Overwhelmed by changes in Employment Law?

Employment Law Update Workshop

Tuesday, October 2, 2012 @ 8:00 am

Join attorneys Jane Lewis Volk and Elaina Smiley for a workshop designed to simplify changes in employment law. This workshop will uncover what human resource professionals need to know about updates in:

• Employment Discrimination
• Family and Medical Leave
• National Labor Relations Act
• Non-Complete Case Law
• Veterans Employment Rights
• Social Media
• Unpaid Internships
• EEOC Guidance on Criminal Background Checks

Please take this opportunity to join us to learn about these updates and strategies for employers.

Click here for additional information or to register.

Was Eminent Domain Used to Benefit A Private Landowner?

Reading Area Water Authority v. The Schuylkill River Greenway Association, et. al, 2012 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 225 (2012)

 

Frank Kosir, Jr., Esquire
fk@muslaw.com

This matter addressed the issue of whether a local sewer authority properly exercised its eminent domain powers to condemn lands for the construction of public water and sewer lines to service a new development to be constructed by a private landowner.  On February 9, 2009 the Reading Area Water Authority (“Authority”) adopted a resolution authorizing itself to use its eminent domain powers to condemn a utility easement across lands (“Property”) titled in The Schuylkill River Greenway Association (“Association.”)  The City Council of the City of Reading subsequently issued a resolution authorizing the condemnation and, on May 4, 2009, the Authority filed a Declaration of Taking condemning an easement (“Easement”) fifty feet in width “for water, sewer and storm water purposes.”  The purpose of the condemnation was to assure water and sewage service to “Water’s Edge Village,” a proposed 219-unit residential subdivision to be constructed on lands titled in Fortune Development (“Fortune,”) and the resolution previously adopted by the Authority provided that Fortune would be solely responsible for all costs incurred in the condemnation proceeding, including the payment of just compensation and other damages to the Association. 

Upon service of the Declaration of Taking, the Association filed Preliminary Objections asserting that the amount of property condemned was excessive given the size of the proposed water line.  Furthermore, while the parties did agree that the Authoroty had the power to condemn land for the installation of water lines, the Association asserted that the Authority’s efforts to condemn lands for the installation of a public sewer line and storm water facilities was outside of its authority and violated Section 204(a) of the Pennsylvania Private Property Protection Act, (26 Pa. C.S. § 204(a)), which precludes the use of eminent domain to acquire lands for the benefit of a private enterprise.  The trial court held a hearing and issued a ruling sustaining the Preliminary Objections, and dismissing the Declaration with prejudice.  In support of its ruling the court concluded that, although the Authority was vested with the power to condemn lands for the installation of water lines, the Declaration’s condemning lands for the installation of sewage lines and storm water facilities was outside of the scope of the Authority’s public purpose (the provision of water) and amounted to nothing more that an effort to transfer the ownership of private property from one owner to another.

On appeal, our Commonwealth Court reversed, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.  In issuing its ruling the court noted that, while the Authority’s specific stated purpose was “the installation of a water main and utility lines,” several factors supported a conclusion that the condemnation was within the scope the Authority’s powers.  First, the proposed storm water outflow is to be combined into the same pipeline conveying sewage effluent.  Second, as required by its Articles of Incorporation, the Authority received authorization from City Council prior to undertaking the project.  Therefore, the purpose of the condemnation as set forth in the Declaration was fully within the scope of the Authority’s purpose, and was a permissible use of the Authority’s eminent domain powers.  Furthermore, there was no evidence that the Authority intended to transfer ownership of the acquired easement to Fortune, or that the Authority planned to relinquish its easement rights in any manner.  As such, while it is true that the condemnation will serve to benefit Fortune by making the homes in its development more attractive for purchase, this does not change the fact that the condemnation does in fact serve a public purpose, namely the provision of water, sewer and storm water management facilities to the members of the public receiving service from the Authority. For these reasons, the condemnation was fully within the scope of the Authority’s eminent domain power, and the trial court erred in dismissing the Declaration of Taking.

Does a Local Ordinance Violate the Pennsylvania Landlord Tenant Act?

Berwick Area Landlord Association, et. al v. Borough of Berwick, 2012 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 187 (2012)

Frank Kosir, Jr., Esquire
fk@muslaw.com

This matter addressed the issue of whether a local ordinance requiring the registration of residential landlords and properties within a borough violated the Pennsylvania Landlord Tenant Act, or other applicable state and federal statutes.  In April, 2007, the Borough of Berwick (“Borough”) enacted a detailed ordinance (“Ordinance”) requiring all rental units within the Borough to be registered, licensed and maintained in accordance with certain specific standards.  The Ordinance set forth a series of obligations binding upon landlords and tenants, established fines and other penalties that could be assessed for violations thereof, and vested the Borough with the authority to enter and inspect any rental premises.  Following the enactment of the Ordinance, the Berwick Area Landlord Association and the Pennsylvania Residential Owners Association  (“Associations”) brought a declaratory judgment action in the Columbia County Court of Common Pleas seeking the invalidation of the Ordinance.  In support of their claims for relief the Associations alleged, inter alia, that the Ordinance was preempted by the Pennsylvania Landlord Tenant Act, and that it violated property owners’ substantive due process rights under Article I, Section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution.  The trial court concluded that the Ordinance was not preempted by the Landlord Tenant Act and, after a rational basis review, also found that the Ordinance did not violate landlords’ substantive due process rights, dismissing the Associations’ action with prejudice. 

 

On appeal, our Commonwealth Court affirmed.  In issuing its ruling, the court noted that the purpose of the Ordinance was “to protect and promote the public health, safety and welfare,” and was the result of an ever-increasing number of rental properties in the Borough being owned by absentee landlords who did not take the actions necessary to ensure that their properties were adequately maintained. With regard to the Associations’ preemption claims the court concluded that, in order for a particular statute or act to preempt a field of law, that statute or act must specifically state that local legislation in that field of law is forbidden, or indicate that local supplementation is not permitted.  In this instance, a review of the Landlord Tenant Act finds no language indicating that it preempts local legislation on landlord/tenant issues, or that it precludes local supplementation of its provisions.  As such, the Landlord Tenant Act permits a local municipal government to use its police powers to enact laws regulating landlord and tenant obligations, so long as those laws do not conflict with the Act.  Therefore, as there was no provision in the Ordinance that conflicted with the Act, the Ordinance was properly sustained.  With regard to the Associations’ constitutional claims, the court rejected the assertion that trial court erred in failing to subject the Ordinance to strict scrutiny review concluding that, as a local law designed to ensure safe, healthy and habitable rental dwellings, it falls within the Borough’s police powers, and was properly subjected to a rational basis review.

DRI Employment & Labor Law Conference - May 1-3, 2013

Ronald L. Hicks, Jr., Esquire
rlh@muslaw.com

Ronald L. Hicks, Jr. will be speaking at the upcoming annual DRI Employment & Labor Law Conference, which will be held May 1-3, 2013 at the Arizona Biltmore in Phoenix.

 

DRI is the preeminent international organization for attorneys engaged in the defense of civil litigation, with approximately 22,000 members worldwide. DRI features many different committees in various substantive areas of law. Every year, this committee organizes and sponsors a 2.5-day conference featuring prominent speakers on various topics of interest, including substantive developments in employment and labor law, litigation tactics, and ethical issues. The annual Employment Law Conference typically draws between 250-350 attendees, consisting of a variety of practitioners interested in the defense of employment-law matters: private-practice attorneys, in-house counsel, insurance professionals, and human-resources professionals from across the country.

 

Registration for this event is not yet available. Please check back at the following site for more details as they become available: http://www.dri.org/Event/20130080.

Perano v. ORD Sewer Authority

Perano v. ORD Sewer Authority, 2012 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 184 (2012)

 

Frank Kosir, Jr., Esquire
fk@muslaw.com

This matter addressed the issue of whether a local sewer authority is permitted to assess monthly sewage charges against a property owner who has not connected his property to the sewer system.  Frank T. Perano (“Perano”) is the owner of the Frenchtown Mobile Park (“Park”) situated in Decatur Township (“Township”), Clearfield County, Pennsylvania.  From its inception, the Park has been serviced by an on-lot sewage treatment system.  In or about 2007, the ORD Sewer Authority (“Authority”) installed a public sewage system (“System”) in the area and, soon thereafter, the Township enacted an ordinance (“Ordinance”) mandating that all property owners in the vicinity of the System connect their properties to the System.  Pursuant to this Ordinance, in December of 2007, the Authority sent Perano a notice advising him that he was required to connect the Park to the System.  Perano failed to do so and, in September of 2008 and June of 2009, the Authority sent him additional notices directing him to connect the Park to the System.  Perano ignored these notices and, in March of 2010, the Authority sent him a notice advising that he owed an overdue balance for unpaid sewage bills, and that water service to the Park would be terminated if this balance was not paid.

 

In April of 2010, Perano filed a petition in the Clearfield County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to Section 3(a)(3) of the Utility Service Tenants Rights Act (“Act”) (68 P.S. § 399.3(a)(3)), contending that the Authority lacked the power to terminate water service to the Park.  In response, the Authority asserted that its previous correspondences with Perano placed him on notice of his obligation to connect the Park to the System, that the provision of such notice authorized the Authority to assess Perano for sewage charges, and that his failure to pay these charges constituted grounds for the termination of water service.  A non-jury trial was held and the court entered a verdict for the Authority, concluding that it did in fact have the right to terminate water service to the Park based upon Perano’s failure to pay the requisite charges.

 

On appeal, our Commonwealth Court affirmed.  In issuing its ruling, the court noted that 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607 authorizes a municipal authority to take all actions necessary to, inter alia, collect charges for services provided by its facilities.  In this instance, the Ordinance required all property owners in the vicinity to connect their properties to the System, and permitting a property owner to refuse to connect to the sewage system would compromise the integrity of the system, and have negative financial implications.  As Perano had been provided with notice of his obligation to connect to the System, and had failed to do so, the Authority was authorized to assess sewage charges against him, and his failure to pay these charges constituted grounds for the termination of water service to the Park. 

Online Cloud Rights Can Get Cloudy

Chad I. Michaelson, Esquire
cim@muslaw.com

An article by Chad Michaelson appeared in the Business Workshop section of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. Click here to read Chad's article “Online Cloud Rights Can Get Cloudy."

Small Businesses Should Obtain Foreign Patent Protection

Peter J. Borghetti, Esquire
pjb@muslaw.com

Peter Borghetti’s article entitled, "Small Businesses Should Obtain Foreign Patent Protection," appeared in the Business Workshop section of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette on the Monday, September 3. Click here to read Peter's article.

Keep Your Rides Running with H-2b Foreign National Workers

Joel Pfeffer, Esquire
jp@muslaw.com

Carnival operators you know the advantage of employing hard-working employees who return year after year.  Foreign nationals can be one source of dedicated and reliable workers.  Many carnival operators employ foreign nationals either through the Department of State J-1 Exchange Visitors Summer Work Travel Program or the Department of Labor (DOL) H-2b Temporary Non-agricultural Employment Program.  Now the rules have changed.  The J-1 program no longer permits traveling fairs as employers.  If you rely on J-1 foreign workers you may have been caught off guard by this development and you will need to consider the H-2b program for next season.

 

Here’s how the H-2b program works:  DOL allows an annual quota of 65,000 foreign workers for all non-agricultural, seasonal businesses, divided between the summer and the winter seasons.  Seasonal employers must recruit U.S. workers by advertising open positions in the newspaper, post the positions with their State Employment Service Agency and file a report with the DOL.  Once the DOL approves, a petition is filed with the Department of Homeland Security that lists the foreign employees by name if they have been identified at the time of filing.  H-2b workers from certain countries are preferred with streamlined processing for those countries.  Employees must apply to U.S. Consulates abroad for the H-2b visa and be prepared to convince the U.S. Consulate abroad of their intent to return home after the season.

 

DOL rules now prohibit recruiters from charging recruitment fees to employees and require employers to cover employee travel expenses to the U.S.  But even with these requirements, the value of employing foreign workers far outweighs the costs of the H-2b program for many carnival operators.  In fact, Amusement Park Workers accounted for 11 percent of all H-2b workers and two traveling carnivals were among the top 10 H-2b employers this year.

 

Employers hiring through the H-2b program must be careful to comply with all aspects of federal employment law.  For example, employers must pay H-2b workers no less than the “prevailing wage” in the industry.  The DOL maintains special statistics for H-2b employees.  Preliminary filings with the DOL are made five to six months prior to the employer’s season and employers who want to take advantage of the program must commence the preliminary filings in a timely manner.  Otherwise, they may find that when their DOL application is approved, the quota is exhausted and H-2b visa slots are no longer available.

 

The DOL is also considering changes to the H-2b program.  You must be careful to stay abreast of changing regulations and follow DOL guidelines closely.  If you do, the H-2b program can be a source of hard-working, loyal and dedicated employees for your carnival.

 

For more information about the H-2B program, please contact Joel Pfeffer at jp@muslaw.com or 412-456-2877.

2012 Construction Law Newsletter

Please click here to download the latest edition of the Construction Law Newsletter. 

 

 

Articles in this edition include:

• Contractors Paying Same Tax Twice? - written by Brandon Rothey
• Union Trustees Now Have Lien Rights in Pennsylvania - written by Jim Mall
• Use of Construction Mortgage Proceeds May Impact Mechanic's Lien Priority - written by Josh Lorenz
• No Waiver of Mandatory Bid Requirements - written by Chad Michaelson
• Board of Claims Not Exclusive Venue for Contract Disputes with Commonwealth - written by Chad Michaelson
• Changes Proposed to Pennsylvania Mechanics' Lien Law - written by Jason Yarbrough

If you would like to be added to our Construction Law mail/email list please email: postmaster@muslaw.com.

Feeling Overwhelmed By Changes in Employment Law?

Employment Law Update Workshop

Tuesday, October 2, 2012 @ 8:00 am

Join attorneys Jane Lewis Volk and Elaina Smiley for a workshop designed to simplify changes in employment law.  This workshop will uncover what human resource professionals need to know about updates in:

• Employment Discrimination
• Family and Medical Leave
• National Labor Relations Act
• Non-Complete Case Law
• Veterans Employment Rights
• Social Media
• Unpaid Internships
• EEOC Guidance on Criminal Background Checks

Please take this opportunity to join us to learn about these updates and strategies for employers.

Click here for additional information or to register.

ABA Intellectual Property Roundtable - September 13th

September Topic: Is copyright infringement a necessary step for patent prosecution?

David G. Oberdick, Esquire
dgo@muslaw.com

David Oberdick will host the Pittsburgh Roundtable for the American Bar Association Intellectual Property Litigation Section. These quarterly meetings allow IP litigation practitioners to network with other attorneys and discuss topics of interest. All practicing attorneys interested in intellectual property matters are invited to attend - you need not be members of the ABA IP Litigation Section.

Click here to view invitation.

RSVP by September 11, 2012 - rsvp@muslaw.com

Location: Meyer, Unkovic & Scott LLP | 535 Smithfield Street, 12th Floor | Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Nursing Facility Case Law Update

In May of this year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued a decision requiring a son to pay for his indigent mother’s care provided in a skilled nursing facility.

 

Brandon B. Rothey, Esquire
bbr@muslaw.com

In Healthcare & Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Liberty Nursing & Rehabilitation Center v. Pittas, a mother received care from a skilled nursing facility for injuries sustained in a car accident.  After discharge, the mother relocated to Greece.  A large portion of the bill remained unpaid.  The Plaintiff instituted a filial support action against the son.  Pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 4603 (the “Act”), the facility sought to hold a son liable for the outstanding amount incurred.  After a three day non-jury trial, the court entered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of approximately $90,000.00.  On appeal, the Superior Court held that the son had sufficient financial ability to pay for the care of the indigent parent and that the parent was indigent for purposes of the Act.

 

Pennsylvania is one of only a small number of states to require such responsibility.  However, the Act is not without its detractors and a bill has been introduced to repeal the filial support law.  House Bill 321 is currently in the Judiciary Committee.  It is unknown at this time whether the Superior Court’s decision will be appealed or whether the House Bill will make it out of Committee.  Rest assured, that the attorneys of Meyer, Unkovic & Scott LLP will continue to monitor these important decisions.

Does a Residential Subdivision = a Planned Community?

Rybarchyk v. Pocono Summit Lake Property Owners Association, Inc., 2012 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 212 (2012)

Frank Kosir, Jr., Esquire
fk@muslaw.com

This matter addressed the issue of whether a residential subdivision constituted a “planned community,” thereby authorizing a private, voluntary homeowners association comprised of certain property owners within the subdivision to assess all property owners for the costs of maintaining certain improvements therein. During the 1950s, Pocono Summit Lakes, Inc. (“Developer”) created the Pocono Summit Lakes Subdivision (“Subdivision”) in Monroe County, Pennsylvania through three separate subdivision plans. Each deed out of the Developer to the individual lot owners in the Subdivision included a provision granting each respective owner “the right and privilege of boating, bathing, fishing and ice skating in the lake of the party of the first part, known as Pocono Summit Lake No. 2,” (“Lake.”) In October of 1959, a group of property owners within the Subdivision created the Pocono Summit Lake Property Owners Association (“Association”), membership in which was voluntary. In the late 1950s, the Developer gave a group of property owners within the Subdivision permission to construct a clubhouse adjacent to the Lake, a clubhouse that was financed solely through private donations. In 1962, the Developer conveyed three parcels of undeveloped land in the vicinity of the Lake to the Association and, in 1979, the Lake itself was conveyed to Association.

In January of 2009, the Association sent notice to all owners of property within the Subdivision informing them of the imposition of mandatory assessments for the maintenance and up keep of the Lake, beaches and clubhouse. In response, a group of property owners(“Owners”) commenced an action in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas seeking a declaratory judgment that the Association lacked the authority to levy assessments against non-member property owners. In response, the Association asserted that the Development was a “planned community” pursuant to the Pennsylvania Uniform Planned Community Act (“Act”) (68 Pa.C.S. § 5101 et seq) and that the Lake, beach and clubhouse areas are “common facilities,” thereby authorizing it to collect assessments from all owners in the Subdivision for use in maintaining and upkeeping these “common facilities.” The trial court granted declaratory judgment for the Owners concluding that, as the beach and pavilion areas are private property titled in the Association, and the Association is a private entity formed by members with exclusive rights and privileges, the Association has no authority under the Act to assess non-member property owners for maintenance and upkeep costs.

On appeal, our Commonwealth Court affirmed. In issuing its ruling, the court concluded that, while the Act does apply to subdivisions existing prior to its enactment to the extent necessary to effectuate the intentions of the parties to that subdivision, there was no evidence in the record that the Developer intended for the Subdivision to be a planned community. First, the recorded subdivision plans made no provision for common areas. Secondly, the deeds of conveyance from the Developer to the individual lot owners did not include any covenants requiring property owners to pay any maintenance or upkeep costs for common areas. Thirdly, title to the Lake was not conveyed to the Association for more than twenty years after the creation of the Subdivision. Finally, the Association itself was not created by the Developer but, rather, was created through a voluntary affiliation of certain property owners within the Subdivision.  As such, the Subdivision was not a planned community under the Act, and the Association had no authority to assess non-member property owners. Furthermore, as each of the deeds of conveyance out of the Developer included a right to use the Lake, the Association could not preclude property owners who refused to pay the assessments from using the Lake.

Who Retains Jurisdiction for Zoning Applicaton?

DeFilippo, et. al v. Cranberry Township Board of Supervisors, et. al, 2012 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 241 (2012).

Frank Kosir, Jr., Esquire
fk@muslaw.com

This matter addressed the issue of whether atownship board of supervisors retains jurisdiction to review a new zoningapplication where their approval of a prior zoning application for the sameproposed project has been appealed to the courts of common pleas. Carsense is the ownerof a 15-acre parcel of land (“Property”) situated in Cranberry Township, ButlerCounty, Pennsylvania. The Property is located in a PlannedIndustrial/Commercial Zoning District (“District”), in which automobile salesand service are a permitted conditional use. In 2010, Carsense filed an application seeking conditional use approvalto construct an automotive dealership/maintenance facility on theProperty. The Cranberry Township Boardof Supervisors (“Supervisors”) held a hearing on the application at whichseveral individuals (“Objectors”) appeared to oppose the application,contending that it did not comply with the applicable Township ordinances. Despite these objections, on November 4,2010, the Supervisors approved the application, granting Carsense thirteen (13)separate waivers of provisions under the Township Zoning Ordinance. On December 3, 2010, the Objectors appealedto the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, contending that the Supervisorshad, inter alia, abused their discretion in granting the application.

In January of 2011, while the Objectors’ appeal wasstill pending, Carsense filed a new land developmentplan and conditional use application changing the location of its proposedbuilding, and reducing the number of requested waivers from thirteen tofive. The Supervisors held a publichearing on the new application, and notice of the hearing was published inaccordance with the requirements of the Pennsylvania Municipalities PlanningCode (“MPC”). The Supervisors held asecond hearing on April 6, 2011, at which time they approved the new plan. Although they failed to appear at any of thehearings held on the new plan, the Objectors subsequently filed a “Supplementto Appeal,” seeking to challenge the Supervisors’ approval of the newplan. In support of this appeal, theObjectors asserted that they had no notice of the new plan until constructionactivities commenced on the Property and that, once their appeal from theapproval of the original plan had been filed, the Supervisors lacked the authorityto review any further applications with regard to the Property until such timeas their appeal had been adjudicated. Inresponse, Carsense filed a motion to strike the“Supplement to Appeal” and to dismiss the earlier appeal as moot. The trial court granted the motion, anddismissed the Objectors’ appeal in its entirety.

On appeal, our Commonwealth Court affirmed. In issuing its ruling, the court noted that,while Section 11002-A(a) of the MPC (53 P.S. §11002-A(a)) provides that anappeal from the determinations of a local agency vests the court of commonpleas with exclusive jurisdiction over that appeal, Section 11003-A(d) of theMPC (53 P.S. §11002-A(d) provides that the filing of an appeal does not staythe action appealed from unless the appellant separately petitions the courtfor a stay. As such, an appeal from aboard of supervisors’ zoning decision does not preclude the board fromconsidering an alternative application relating to the same project. In this matter, the Objectors failed to takeany action to request a stay and, as the Board of Supervisors approved the newplan, their appeal of the original approval was moot, and was properlydismissed by the trial court.

3 Common Pitfalls of Asset Purchase Agreements

Ronald L. Hicks, Jr., Esquire
rlh@muslaw.com

Avoiding boilerplate language in APAs will save time and money if litigation arises.

This is part five of a series of articles written by Ron Hicks that were published on Inside Counsel's website.

Click here to read the full article (part 3).